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Българските практики за събиране, проверяване и споделяне на информация са анализирани от посланик Джон Байърли през 2007 в секретен доклад до Държавния департаментс най-висока степен на класификация [07SOFIA1284]. Докладът е изготвен по запитване от Вашингтон, формулирано в грама, която не е налична в Wikileaks [07SECSTATE133921]. Освен отговорът от София, в публикуваните от Wikileaks доклади се откриват отговорите на още 23 посолства на САЩ.

Обменът на данни между българските институции е мотивиран от политическа корупция. Българските агенции по-охотно обменят информация с чуждестранни ведомства, отколкото помежду си, но за сметка на това пазят ревниво интересите на богатите и властимащи българи. Корумпирани български полицаи използват партньорска информация, за да прикриват укриващи се от правосъдието. Освен това е нещо нормално от службите да тече класифицирана информация – това са шокиращите изводи от доклада.

България не поддържа свой национален списък на терористи е първото заключение в грамата. В друг, по-ранен доклад [06SOFIA1656] това също е подчертано и е уточнено, че българските служби ползват европейски източници и такива от ООН, за да идентифицират терористи и терористически организации.

В доклада са изброени по-важните бази данни, с които оперират българските служби. НСС (сега ДАНС) разполага със списък на лица под наблюдение, в който се проверяват влизащите в страната. Контактите на посолството обаче отказали да кажат колко имена съдържа тази база данни, а американците не са сигурни, че разузнавачите ни знаят колко са фигурите на организираната престъпност вписани в нея.

Имиграционните служби и гранична полиция имат достъп до две компютъризирани бази данни: Автоматичната информационна система за издирвани лица и Автоматичната информационна система за граничен контрол, научаваме от грамата. Последната система очевидно е била описана и в друг доклад от 2006 г. който обаче също не се открива в Wikileaks.

Вътрешното министерство поддръжа компютърна база данни с информация за издирвани лица, откраднати коли, невалидни документи, оръжия, валута и други вещи, които имат уникален идентификационен номер. В тази база могат да търсят информация граничните полицаи и полицейските управления, които също така могат да я допълват.

НСС има агенти за свръзка във всички полицейски агенции, така че е твърде възможно информацията да се използва и за разузнавателни нужди, и за нуждите на правоохраняването. Посланикът обаче уточнява, че не е могъл да потвърди тези практики.

Българските правителствени агенции обаче нямат обща консолидирана база данни и поддръжат отделни информационни масиви. Тази информация не е новост и е илюстрирана от мъчителната сага на Единната информационна система за противодействие на престъпността (ЕИСПП), която след 16 години изграждане и похарчени 20 милиона лева отново е записана като „неотложна мярка“ в поредния правителствен екшън план за справяне с критиките на Европейската комисия.

България има подписани споразумения за обмен на информация за имената на пасажерите (системата PNR). Усъвършенстваната Система за Информация за Пасажерите (APIS) и Интерактивната Усъвършенствана Система за Информация за Пасажерите (IAPIS) са били ефективни за откриване на заплахи за националната сигурност. Възможно е обаче корумпирани полицейски служители да ги използват, за да помагат на укриващи се от правосъдието, предупреждава посланикът.

Най-интересен е параграфът, в който Байърли дава оценка на партньорските процедури за обмен на информация.

Когато американците се обръщат към българското правителство и подчинените му агенции като към партньори, те трябва да се съобразяват с политическите реалности и като по-приложим се налага подходът „разходи/ползи“. Това е така, защото корупцията, в смисъл на партийни взаимовръзки, остава голям проблем и отразява политическите, културните и понякога личните чувствителности, когато се търси информация за български граждани. Байърли смята, че това се дължи частично на конституционални ограничения, частично на спомена за злоупотреби през комунистическата епоха и частично на културата на фаворитизъм и защитаване на богатите и разполагащите с власт.

В случаите, когато американците търсят информация за български граждани, замесени в нещо или защитаващи свои интереси, вероятността информацията, методите и средствата да бъдат компрометирани е изключително висока – предупреждава Байърли. Ако обаче американците искат информация без връзка с българските интереси, тогава може да се разчита на изключително сътрудничеството и сигурен обмен на информация.

Подобна оценка е дадена от Байърли и в грама от 2005 г., посветена на тогавашния главен секретар на МВР Бойко Борисов. Според посланика той е бил изключително отворен за сътрудничество с американците, но само за случаи, които не засягат фигури на българската организирана престъпност.

Защитата и неразпространението на информацията са заложени в писаното законодателство, което обаче рядко се спазва. Нещо повече, нормално е българските медии да получават класифицирани документи относно националната сигурност, които впоследствие се публикуват – отбелязва посланикът.

S E C R E T SOFIA 001284 
SIPDIS 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
S/CT KEN MCKUNE; CIA FOR NCTC 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2032 
TAGS: PTER KVPR PREL PGOV PINR CVIS ASEC KHLS BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIA:  INFORMATION ON HOST GOVERNMENT 
PRACTICES - INFORMATION COLLECTION, SCREENING, AND SHARING 
REF: A. A) SECSTATE 133921 
¶B. B) 06 SOFIA 01656 
¶C. C) 06 SOFIA 01703 
Classified By: DCM Alex Karagiannis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
¶1.  (U)  This cable provides information on Bulgarian 
Government practices on information collection, screening, 
and sharing.  Responses correspond to questions listed in REF 
¶A. 
WATCHLISTING 
¶2.  (SBU)  According to our contacts at the Financial 
Intelligence Agency and other Bulgarian government entities, 
Bulgaria does not maintain its own "national" list of 
terrorists (SEE REF B). 
¶3.  (C//NF)  Travelers entering Bulgaria are subjected to a 
watchlist check.  The database is maintained by the Bulgarian 
National Security Service (NSS), the country's intelligence 
service, which is part of the Ministry of the Interior (MOI). 
(NOTE:  There is draft legislation proposed moving the NSS 
to a new National Agency for Security (NAS); NSS functions 
and responsibilities on counterterrorism issues would not 
change, but could be expanded.) Additionally, law enforcement 
information is entered by the Bulgaria's General Police 
Directorate for Combating Organized Crime.  Our contacts 
declined to disclose the specific number of records 
maintained in the database, and we are not certain they 
themselves have an accurate fix number when it comes to 
quantifiable organized crime figures.  Bulgarian officials at 
all ports of entry have access to two computerized 
immigration databases, the Automated Information System (AIS) 
for "Wanted Persons" and the AIS for "Border Control" (SEE 
REF C). 
¶3.  (SBU)  The MOI maintains a computerized watchlist 
database that includes information about wanted persons, 
stolen vehicles, invalid identification documents and blank 
IDs, weapons, currency and other items that have unique 
identification.  This database is connected to the AIS for 
"Border Control," and all POEs have access to it.  Persons in 
the database are identified by name as well as other data. 
The domestic sources of information for the MOI,s watchlist 
and other databases are the National Police (including all 
Police Directorates), the National Security Service, the 
investigation agencies, the Prosecutor's Office and the 
Courts.  Every police directorate or service has access to 
the databases and the authority to input the information into 
the database.  All POEs have access to and use INTERPOL,s 
watchlist.  Once Bulgaria accedes to the Schengen Agreement, 
expected in spring 2008, Bulgaria's immigration database AIS 
"Border Control" will be linked to the Schengen database and 
to the EU visa database.  Bulgaria has a bilateral watchlist 
agreement with Romania for sharing border control information 
and a contact bureau located at the Gyrgevo POE (on the 
Romanian border).  The bureau includes a shared information 
database, which can be accessed by all relevant Bulgarian 
agencies.  Bulgaria also shares information with all 
neighboring countries through a variety of Joint Border 
Committees. 
TRAVELER INFORMATION COLLECTION 
¶4.  (SBU)  Bulgarian Border Police follow procedures outlined 
by EU directives with respect to screening and control of 
foreign travelers.  Officials do not collect or maintain 
travel information outside these guidelines unless is it 
warranted by lookout guidance or directed by supervisors. 
There are no different policies for air, sea, and land entry 
and for domestic flights.  There is no collection on domestic 
travel.  The Bulgarian Border Police collects traveler 
information. 
¶5.  (S/NF)  Formally, Bulgarian authorities require prior 
coordination at the Secretary General of the Ministry of 
Interior level as a starting point for case and information 
exchange.  Once this is established, further 
coordination/information exchange occurs at operational 
levels.  Informally, established contacts exchange 
information regularly, which expedites operational activities. 
¶6.  (S/NF)  Bulgaria's National Security Service has liaison 
agents embedded in all police agencies, thus it is highly 
likely that the information is used for intelligence and law 
enforcement purposes.  We have been unable to confirm if 
Bulgaria has any existing treaties to share Passenger Name 
Record (PNR) data.  Advance Passenger Information Systems 
(APIS), Interactive Advanced Passenger Information System 
(IAPIS), and electronic travel authority systems have been 
effective at detecting other national security threats, but 
such systems may be assets to corrupt police officials. 
Their application to aid and assist fugitives should be noted. 
BORDER CONTROL AND SCREENING 
¶7.  (SBU)  The Government of Bulgaria employs software to 
screen travelers of security interest. 
¶8.  (C/NF)  Bulgaria employs machine readable passport 
technology at air and land crossing points.  Due to its 
recent accession to the European Union on January 1, 2007, 
EU citizens are permitted entry based on their national ID 
cards or passports.  Directives have been given to the Border 
Police not to screen (pre-boarding passenger security check) 
EU citizens unless a specific notice is published. 
Non-Bulgarian citizens are screened by the verbal orders of 
the Chief Director of the Border Police. 
¶9.  (SBU)  Bulgaria's border police have access to 
INTERPOL/EUROPOL systems for Red and Yellow notices, and have 
policies regarding detaining undocumented refugees. 
BIOMETRIC COLLECTION 
¶10.  (SBU)  Biometric systems are in place at all POEs where 
an AFIS (Automated Fingerprint Information System) station is 
installed.  The AFIS Stations are independent systems that do 
not share information with the AIS "Border Control."  The GOB 
is working on a new border control information system that 
will be available at all POEs and will be able to identify 
people by fingerprints.  Fingerprint readers and combined 
optical and RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) readers 
will be installed in all POEs.  The GOB currently uses a 
fingerprint identification system that is ICAO compliant. 
Bulgaria presently issues passports with advanced security 
features and a digitized photo, but with no other biometric 
information. 
PASSPORTS 
¶11.  (SBU)  The GOB expects to start issuing biometric 
passports in the third quarter of 2008.  Replacement 
passports are issued only for full validity.  There are no 
special regulations/procedures for dealing with "habitual" 
losers of passports.  Replacement passports are of the same 
appearance and page length as regular passports.  Post has 
not seen any increase in the number of replacement or "clean" 
passports used to apply for U.S. Visas, but has seen that 
pattern in the past.  Since Bulgaria joined the EU on January 
1, 2007, the EU Border Police no longer stamp the passports 
of the passengers who are coming to or going from other EU 
member states.  The Border Police stamps the passports of US 
passengers coming from the U.S. and the passports of 
passengers from any other non-EU country.   Replacement 
passports cannot be identified, they look exactly the same as 
regular passports, and they have the same number series. 
FRAUD DETECTION 
¶12.  (C/NF)  Fraud detection efforts by the Bulgarian 
authorities are not sufficiently aggressive.  Although 
Bulgarian passports and national identity cards have modern 
security features and are extremely difficult to counterfeit, 
avenues exist to present fraudulent documents to corrupt 
public officials and receive valid Bulgarian residency and 
travel documents. 
PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY 
¶13.  (SBU)  The Criminal Procedure Code regulates the 
procedure for questioning, detention, etc., and maintaining 
of records anywhere in the country.  The records are stored 
in the case file for the duration of the proceedings, and 
upon case completion the information is archived.  Usually, 
the archiving period is 20 years (Law on the National 
Archives).  If the records contain classified information, 
that period could vary from two to 30 years, depending on the 
security level (Law on the Protection of Classified 
Information).  According to the Law on Personal Data 
Protection, Art. 4, personal data can be processed when 
required by a statute; the individual has given permission; 
it is required by a contract; the individual's life/health 
should be defended; or it is in the public interest.  The law 
explicitly prohibits the processing of personal data which 
would reveal the person's race or ethnicity; political, 
religious or philosophical values or membership in political 
parties or other organizations or associations; health 
conditions, sexual life or the human genome. 
¶14.  (SBU)  Databases may be created for different reasons on 
the basis of laws, and depending on each specific law, there 
would be a prescribed action allowing or restricting a public 
notice of the new database.  Each personal data administrator 
is obliged to introduce at least the standards provided in 
Regulation No. 1 of February 7, 2007 on the minimum level of 
technical and organizational measures for an allowed type of 
data protection.  The Regulation establishes three protection 
levels, depending on the risk assessment:  basic, middle, and 
high.  Articles 9-31 provide detailed description of the 
required protection standards. 
¶15.  (SBU)  According to Art. 161 (4) et seq. of the Law on 
the Ministry of Interior, and Art. 37s(3) et seq. of the Law 
on Defense and the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bulgaria, 
every person is entitled to ask for access and obtain a copy 
of the personal data collected by security agencies without 
that person's knowledge.  Access could be denied if revealing 
the information would pose a risk to the national security or 
public order; compromise classified information; compromise 
sources of information or the techniques for data collection; 
or harm the legally defined powers of the Ministry of the 
Interior.  The denial can be appealed in the administrative 
court.  Different rules apply only to the extent information 
is treated with different security protection.  Raw data is 
considered sensitive information, which is protected under 
the Law on Personal Data Protection.  On the other hand, case 
files may contain classified information, which is protected 
under the Law on Classified Information Protection.  The Law 
on the Ministry of the Interior (Art. 160) and the Regulation 
of June 26, 2007 on police registration regulate the handling 
of enforcement records.  According to Art. 70(1) of the Law 
on Bulgarian Identity Documents, data collected in the 
Bulgarian identity documents database, except for 
fingerprints, can be provided to Bulgarian citizens and 
non-citizens as long as the data do not concern third 
persons.  Art. 71 of the same law allows the denials of 
access to such data to be appealed in the administrative 
court. 
IDENTIFYING APPROPRIATE PARTNERS 
¶16.  (S/NF)  When assessing the Government of Bulgaria and 
its constituent agencies as a partner, the political 
realities in Bulgaria are such that a cost/benefit method 
approach is more applicable.  Corruption, especially in the 
sense of partisan connections, remains a problem, and at 
times reflects political, cultural, and sometimes personal 
sensitivities when involving Bulgarian citizens, stemming 
from in part constitutional issues, in part, on historic 
memory of communist era abuses, and in part on a culture of 
favoritism that protects the rich and powerful.  In cases 
where a Bulgarian citizen is involved or has an interest to 
protect, the likelihood that information, means and methods 
would be compromised is extremely high.  In contrast, without 
a nexus to Bulgarian interests, then exceptional cooperation 
and exchange will occur.  Although written legislation 
provides safeguards for the protection and nondisclosure of 
information it is applied rarely.  Moreover, it is 
commonplace for the Bulgarian media to receive sensitive 
documents concerning national security or law enforcement 
matters and subsequently publish them. 
¶17.  (C//NF)  There is no single consolidated database; all 
government agencies have separate databases.  Bulgarian 
agencies do share information; their motives may be driven by 
political favors/corruption as well as law enforcement. 
Bulgarian agencies would rather share information with 
foreign entities than amongst themselves. 
¶18.  (SBU)  Bulgaria has ratified all major international 
instruments on terrorism, extradition, and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters.  Bulgaria recently joined 
EUROPOL.  On July 23, 2007, the EU Council General Affairs 
and External Relations adopted the decision concerning the 
accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the EUROPOL convention. 
The decision entered into force on August 1, 2007 after 
having been published in the Official Journal of the European 
Union.  Bulgaria participated in an official welcoming 
ceremony in The Hague on October 3, 2007. 
¶19.  (SBU)  Bulgarian law defines terrorism and terrorist 
acts in line with EU legal and sentencing guidelines:  Art. 
180a(1) of the Penal Code:  "Who, for the purpose of  causing 
commotion and fear to the population, or threat or compel a 
body of the authority, a representative of the public or a 
representative of a foreign country or of an international 
organization, to do or omit something in the sphere of his 
functions, commits a crime according to Art. 115, 128; Art. 
142 para 1; Art. 216 para 1; Art. 326; Art. 330, para 1; Art. 
334; Art. 334, para 1; Art. 337, para 1; Art. 339, para 1; 
Art. 340, para 1 and 2; Art. 341a, para 1 - 3; Art. 341b, 
para 1, Art. 344; Art. 347, para 1; Art. 348; Art. 349, para 
1 and 3; Art. 350, para 1; Art. 352, para 1; Art. 354, para 
1, Art. 356f, para 1; Art. 356h; shall be punished for 
terrorism by imprisonment from five to 15 years and when 
death has been caused by imprisonment from fifteen to thirty 
years, life imprisonment or life imprisonment without an 
option." 
Beyrle
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